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ABSTRACT: This Article addresses hospitals’ use of economic crite-
ria to determine an individual’s qualifications for staff privileges.
Hospitals are resorting to economic conflict-of-interest
credentialing policies in an attempt to ensure physician’s loyalty
and maintain their own economic viability. Physicians, however,
argue that entrepreneurial activities are necessary for them to meet
the economic challenges posed by declining reimbursements and
rising insurance costs. The Article surveys the numerous legal theo-
ries that physicians (and, in some cases, the federal government)
could employ in attacking these new types of credentialing poli-
cies and concludes that, on balance, hospitals should be able to
implement their policies in ways that minimize liability in most
jurisdictions. The Article concludes by discussing other issues that
economic credentialing policies raise, including those implicat-
ing tax-exempt status and nonlegal considerations.
* Ms. Weeks is an associate at the Houston office of Vinson & Elkins L.L.P, and a
Visiting Assistant Professor at The University of Georgia for the 2003-2004
academic year, where she teaches health law.
Physician income is under assault by declining reimburse-ments and skyrocketing medical malpractice insurancecosts. To compensate for their lost income, many physi-
cians have turned to various entrepreneurial activities, such as
investing in or becoming part owners of healthcare facilities,
pharmacies, or supply companies; opening specialty clinics and
hospitals; entering joint ventures with other physicians, hospi-
tals, or clinics; or participating in other healthcare enterprises.1
These physicians typically have staff privileges or medical staff





membership at hospitals in the same geographic market as the
facilities in which they have ownership or investment interests.
For example, a group of orthopedic surgeons may open a
specialty hospital or ambulatory surgical center while main-
taining staff privileges at the local, general, acute-care hospital.
Depending on the type of procedure to be performed or care to
be provided, these orthopedic surgeons could choose to refer a
patient for treatment at either the specialty hospital in which
they have an economic investment or the general, community
hospital at which they have admitting privileges. The commu-
nity hospital’s concern is that physician owners or investors
will “cherry pick” the more profitable cases for treatment at
their own specialty hospital and will refer the most expensive
and least profitable cases, such as the difficult-to-treat and
uninsured, to the general hospital.2
Facing their own economic crisis as a result of declining reim-
bursement and rising insurance costs, hospitals are taking steps
to protect their revenue streams. General, full-service hospitals
are able to offer essential but unprofitable services, such as an
emergency room, labor and delivery services, pediatrics, and
critical care, as well as charity care, by maintaining other,
profitable practice areas, such as orthopedics and cardiology.3  If
profitable cases are no longer referred to the general hospital, but
rather to a physician-owned specialty clinic, the decrease in
revenue threatens not only a for-profit hospital’s ability to make
a profit but also any hospital’s ability to remain operational.4
In response to increasing competition from their physicians,
many hospitals are adopting policies to limit, or effectively
prohibit, certain competitive behavior. For example, hospitals
may refuse to grant initial or continuing staff privileges to
physicians who own or have other financial interests in com-
peting healthcare entities, refer patients to competing entities,
have staff privileges at any other area hospitals, or fail to admit
some specified percentage of their patients to the hospital.5
Alternatively, the hospital might require a physician seeking
privileges to sign a loyalty oath or pledge to perform a certain
percentage of medical services at the hospital.6
The overall effect of such policies is to restrict or prohibit
physicians who apply for or hold medical staff privileges at the
hospital from owning or investing in competing facilities.
Hospitals maintain that policies limiting or prohibiting physi-
cians’ economic conflicts of interest are necessary to ensure





physician loyalty and maintain economic viability. Physicians,
however, contend that such policies impair their ability to
practice medicine and provide quality care to patients at the
best possible, or most convenient, facility. This Article addresses
the legal and operational implications of these economic con-
flict of interest credentialing policies.
I. Background
As a general rule, a hospital has the “unquestioned right to
exercise some control over the identity and number of doctors
to whom it accords staff privileges.”7  Courts have noted that
“[h]ospitals are not public utilities, required to grant staff
privileges to anyone with a medical license.”8  It is well estab-
lished that a physician has no constitutional right to staff
privileges at a hospital, public or private, merely because he is
licensed to practice medicine.9  Thus, a hospital may “close its
doors to certain physicians.”10  Traditionally, a hospital’s deci-
sion to deny or revoke staff privileges has been based on physi-
cian qualifications or quality of care concerns.11  For example,
medical staff privileges might be conditioned on certain educa-
tional or training requirements, or a physician might be denied
or removed from the medical staff because of a history of
malpractice claims or adverse treatment events.
In the early 1980s, many hospitals invoked the general right to
“close their doors to certain physicians”12  and entered into
exclusive contracts with hospital-based specialists. An exclusive
contract is an arrangement between a hospital or healthcare
institution and a physician or group of physicians, by which the
hospital grants the contracting physician or physician group
the exclusive right to provide specified medical services at the
hospital in exchange for the services and managerial tasks the
physicians provide.13  Exclusive contract arrangements might
also be based on granting a physician or physician group
exclusive access to certain equipment, facilities, or laboratories,
or by granting an exclusive right to perform certain procedures.
Hospitals have relied on exclusive contract arrangements pri-
marily for specialties such as anesthesiology, pathology, radiol-
ogy, and other ancillary services that require extensive coverage
and rely on referrals from other physicians.14
Hospitals justified these exclusive contract arrangements on
the theories that they enhanced hospital efficiency, increased
the hospital’s control over departmental operations, insured
full-time availability of services, permitted better scheduling of





facilities, reduced costs through standardization of procedures
and centralized administrations, and improved the quality of
particular services by assuring that physicians perform a suffi-
cient quantity of procedures to remain proficient. The effect of
an exclusive contract arrangement is to deny staff privileges to
new applicants for the particular hospital department to which
the exclusive contract applies. Further, staff privileges for cur-
rent members of the affected department who are not parties to
the exclusive contract are revoked or denied. These excluded
physicians frequently challenged hospitals’ exclusive contract
arrangements, asserting that the policies were arbitrary or
unreasonable, interfered with the rights of physicians to prac-
tice medicine, denied patients the right to select their own
physicians, intruded upon the physician-patient relationship,
or operated as unlawful restraints on trade. Such challenges,
however, were almost uniformly unsuccessful.15
In the leading case of Jefferson Parish Hospital District, No. 2 v.
Hyde, the United States Supreme Court held that a hospital’s
decision to enter into an exclusive contract with a group of
anesthesiologists did not constitute an illegal tying arrange-
ment because anesthesiology could not be viewed as a distinct
product that was “tied” to other hospital services.16  Further-
more, the Court held that the arrangement did not violate the
Sherman Act as an unlawful restraint of trade because the
hospital’s market share of thirty percent was not so great that
medical services consumers had no choice but to purchase
anesthesiology services from the exclusive contracting group.17
The exclusive contract, therefore, would not harm competition
in the relevant market.18  Since Jefferson Parish, courts generally
have upheld exclusive contract arrangements challenged on
antitrust grounds.19
As an alternative to an exclusive contract, a hospital may adopt
a “closed staff” policy to close certain hospital departments, or
the entire hospital medical staff, to new applicants. A hospital
may offer various business justifications for closing its medical
staff, such as assuring the economic survival of the hospital,
producing efficient administration of the department or ser-
vice, coping with overcrowding and bed limitations, maintain-
ing particular skills by ensuring that physicians will perform an
adequate number of specialized procedures, attaining economy
and efficiency of operations, lowering mortality rates, further-
ing teaching and research, fostering teamwork, and limiting
access to sophisticated and unique equipment.20  Courts ad-
dressing closed staff policies tend to view such arrangements in
the same light as exclusive contract arrangements.21





A recent decision by the Supreme Court of South Dakota, Mahan
v. Avera St. Luke’s,22  expressly recognized that a closed staff policy
could be justified solely by economic concerns. In Mahan, a
physician alleged that a nonprofit hospital’s decision to close
its medical staff constituted a breach of contract. The hospital,
Avera St. Luke’s, had decided to recruit one or two new
neurosurgeons and two new orthopedic surgeons to the hospi-
tal, which is located in Aberdeen, South Dakota.23  Avera St. Luke’s
had difficulty attracting applicants, given the small size of the
community and the fact there were orthopedic spinal surgeons
already practicing in the area.24  At about the same time that
Avera St. Luke’s was engaged in its recruitment effort, several
orthopedic surgeons in Aberdeen were building a new ambula-
tory orthopedic surgery center that would compete directly
with the hospital. In response to this direct competition and the
hospital’s need for neurosurgeons, the hospital board of direc-
tors determined that it was economically necessary to close
medical staff privileges to perform spinal surgery and general
orthopedic surgery to new applicants.25  This closed staff policy
affected only new applicants; privileges of the physicians al-
ready on the medical staff remained intact.
Dr. Mahan, an orthopedic surgeon who specialized in spinal
surgery, was recruited by the physicians who ran the ambula-
tory surgery center. Dr. Mahan applied for privileges at Avera
St. Luke’s, but the hospital denied his application based on its
new closed staff policy.26  Dr. Mahan and the orthopedic sur-
geons who recruited him sued the hospital, alleging breach of
contract based on the hospital’s medical staff bylaws.27  The
Supreme Court of South Dakota upheld the policy, finding the
hospital’s closed medical staff arrangement was soundly within
the discretion of the hospital’s board of directors.28  Specifically,
the court noted:
The Board’s decision to close the hospital’s facil-
ity for certain, named procedures was a reason-
able administrative decision. It had determined
that the [staff] closures were necessary to insure
the continued economic viability of the hospital. The
Board must be allowed to make such reasonable,
independent decisions if it is to continue to pro-
vide comprehensive medical services to the Aber-
deen community.29
The court expressly recognized that the hospital relied on “the
profitable neurosurgical services” in order to be able to continue





offering “other unprofitable services” in the Aberdeen area.30  The
court’s decision seemed informed by the unique economics of
hospital financing that require cost-spreading as a way of funding
treatment for uninsured and underinsured patients.
The Mahan decision is consistent with the general tendency of
courts to uphold a hospital’s legitimately adopted policy and
not to substitute the court’s judgment for that of hospital
management.31  As long as the hospital’s board is acting in good
faith, a decision to exclude new physician applicants may be
based upon “any reasonable basis, such as the professional and
ethical qualifications of the physician or the common good of the
public and the Hospital.”32  Although it is generally accepted that
hospitals may consider quality of care issues in staff privileging
decisions, it is less well accepted that hospitals may consider
other factors, particularly economic factors, when denying or
revoking a physician’s staff privileges. The Mahan decision is
one of the few cases squarely recognizing a hospital’s right to
base staff privileging decisions on economic concerns rather
than physician qualifications. Specifically, the Mahan court
held that concern about the hospital’s “continued economic
viability” justified the hospital board’s policy decision to ex-
clude certain physicians from the medical staff.33
Courts tend to scrutinize credentialing decisions based on
economic factors more closely than credentialing decisions
based on quality of care or professional competency. “Economic
credentialing” involves a hospital considering factors relating
to the efficient management of the organization to determine
medical staff membership or privileges.34  Economic credentialing
may be based on various factors, including the frequency of a
physician’s use of the hospital, bed capacity,35  the physician’s
ability to use hospital facilities in an economically efficient
manner, patient profiles, diagnosis-related groups and average
lengths of stay,36  types and quantity of services and supplies
that the physician orders for patients,37  payor mix, level of
reimbursement generated by the physician’s admissions,38  or a
particular physician’s contribution to the economic success of
the organization.39  Such credentialing policies that address
hospitals’ concerns over appropriate resource utilization and
overall efficiency seem justified in today’s increasingly cost-
conscious healthcare market.40
Credentialing based on physicians’ economic conflicts of inter-
est, however, is relatively uncharted territory. These policies,
based on ownership, investment, or affiliation with competing
facilities are subject to many challenges. Specifically, physicians





argue that hospitals’ economic conflict-of-interest policies,
such as the policy approved in Mahan, that have the effect of
directing or limiting where physicians can refer their patients
for treatment, are inconvenient and could endanger patients.41
The American Medical Association (AMA) announced in 2000
that the organization “strongly opposes the practice of eco-
nomic credentialing.”42  In particular, the AMA opposes condi-
tioning staff privileges on physicians’ signing loyalty oaths,
requiring physicians to refer a specified percentage of their
patients to the hospital, or requiring physicians to sever all ties
with competing institutions, even if such institutions could
offer higher quality patient care than the hospital.43
Few legal challenges have been brought against these new
economic conflict of interest policies. The policies, however, are
vulnerable to challenges similar to those brought against “tra-
ditional” economic credentialing policies, such as exclusive
contracts and closed staff arrangements. In particular, a hospi-
tal adopting a policy that restricts or prohibits physicians on its
medical staff from engaging in competitive behavior or enter-
prises could expect to face antitrust, due process, and breach of
contract claims. In addition, a hospital should consider other
factors bearing on the decision to adopt such a policy, such as the
risk of civil or criminal sanctions under federal healthcare stat-
utes, difficulty in enforcing policies that operate as covenants
not to compete, endangerment of a nonprofit hospital’s tax-
exempt status, and the possibility of a public relations backlash.
II. Legal Challenges
By conditioning staff privileges on a physician’s agreement to
forego investments in or associations with other healthcare
facilities, a hospital erects a barrier to competition, a business
practice that implicates antitrust law. Further, when a hospital
adopts such a policy, it may effectively terminate staff privileges
of current medical staff members who already own or have
invested in competing specialty clinics, hospitals, or other
businesses. Such termination raises due process issues and may
require the hospital to provide excluded physicians with indi-
vidual hearings or other procedural rights before adopting the
policy. In addition, some courts view medical staff bylaws as
contracts between hospitals and their medical staff members.
Such contracts may prevent the hospital board or administra-
tion from unilaterally amending the bylaws or adopting new
policies, limit the grounds on which a medical staff member can
be terminated, or specify certain procedures that must be fol-
lowed before termination. A physician, therefore, might allege





breach of contract based on the hospital’s adopting a new
economic credentialing policy in violation of the bylaws.
A. Antitrust Challenges
Hospital policies or decisions that deny or terminate a physician’s
medical staff membership for economic reasons, such as owner-
ship or investment in competing enterprises, may impair physi-
cians’ ability to practice their profession and operate a business.
Accordingly, physicians may challenge such economic conflict-
of-interest policies under federal and state antitrust laws.44  The
federal antitrust claims can be separated into two groups:
(1) those alleging joint activity under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act; and (2) those alleging unilateral action under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act based on monopolizing or attempting to
monopolize the market.
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade.45  “To
prevail on a section one claim, plaintiffs must show that the
defendants (1) engaged in a conspiracy (2) that produced some
anti-competitive effect (3) in the relevant market.”46  Accord-
ingly, the first element of a Section 1 claim is the existence of a
conspiracy or proof of joint activity.47  Unilateral action is not
illegal under Section 1. Some courts have held that a hospital is
legally incapable of conspiring with its medical staff based on
the rule that a corporation cannot conspire with its officers and
directors.48  Other courts have concluded that a conspiracy is
possible in this situation.49
Assuming that a hospital is legally capable of conspiring with
its own medical staff, the plaintiff must still provide evidence of
a conspiracy. Whether the conspiracy requirement of a Sec-
tion 1 claim is met will turn on the facts in each individual case.
For example, if an excluded physician could show that two
separate entities conspired to exclude him from the market, a
court could conclude that there is evidence of a conspiracy.
When economic credentialing activities are performed by the
hospital alone, without any physician involvement, the Sec-
tion 1 conspiracy requirement likely will not be met, and the
antitrust challenge will fail.50  To avoid a Section 1 challenge,
therefore, hospital boards of directors might consider making
economic credentialing decisions alone, without physician in-
volvement. If the hospital’s board or credentialing committee
includes physicians, the board or committee could recuse those





physician members from credentialing decisions based on eco-
nomic criteria.
Even assuming that a court concludes that there is a conspiracy,
Section 1 also requires proof of anticompetitive effect. Some
types of restraints on trade are considered per se illegal without
any need to analyze the relevant market.51  The per se rule is
limited to activities that “always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output.”52  If the activity is not
per se illegal, courts will analyze the anticompetitive effect of a
particular policy under a rule of reason analysis.53
The per se analysis generally is inappropriate in the medical
staffing context because “there is nothing obviously
anticompetitive about a hospital choosing one staffing pattern
over another or in restricting the staff to some rather than
many, or all.”54  Thus, hospital credentialing activities generally
are not considered per se anticompetitive; courts considering
medical staff cases invariably apply a rule of reason analysis.55  A
threshold question under the rule of reason analysis is whether
the defendant possesses “market power” in the relevant mar-
ket.56  The plaintiff must present evidence to define the geo-
graphic market allegedly affected.57  Absent evidence defining
the relevant market58  or demonstrating market power, there is
no need to examine competitive justifications or effects because
the court presumes that the activity will have no anticompetitive
effect.59  Accordingly, to challenge a hospital’s economic
credentialing policy under Section 1, a physician first would
have to define the relevant market and demonstrate that the
hospital has sufficient market power to unlawfully restrain
trade.60  Otherwise, the Section 1 antitrust challenge will fail at
the outset.
If the court concludes that the hospital possesses market power,
the court then would balance the anticompetitive effects of the
economic credentialing policy against the pro-competitive ben-
efits or justifications for the policy.61  The hospital would need
to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for the challenged
policy, such as to maintain the hospital’s economic viability or
improve efficiency.62
Most challenges to medical staff determinations brought under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act have failed.63  As one court noted:
The cases involving staffing at a single hospital are
legion. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of pages in





West publications are devoted to the issues those
circumstances present. . . .
Those hundreds or thousands of pages almost al-
ways come to the same conclusion: the staffing
decision at a single hospital was not a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.64
Accordingly, given the difficulty in establishing a conspiracy
and in defining the relevant market in these cases, an economic
conflict-of-interest policy may survive a Section 1 Sherman Act
challenge.
2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Physicians also may attempt to challenge economic
credentialing policies under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits the willful acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power in a relevant market.65  Section 2 also prohib-
its the attempt to acquire a monopoly.66
To prevail on a monopolization claim, an excluded physician
would have to prove both that the hospital possesses monopoly
power in the relevant market and that it willfully acquired or
maintained such power. “Monopoly power is the power to
control prices or exclude competition.”67  Market share is typi-
cally used as a proxy for monopoly power.68  Market power is
usually difficult to assess and even more difficult to prove in
court.69  Failure to prove market power will defeat a Section 2
claim, just like a Section 1 claim, from the outset.70
Another element of a Section 2 Sherman Act claim is proof that
the hospital willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power.71
Business growth or development that results from “a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident” does not violate
the antitrust laws.72  Consequently, an economic credentialing
policy that is intended to limit staff physicians from owning or
acquiring an interest in a competing facility could show that a
hospital “willfully maintained” monopoly power. One argu-
ment that a hospital could make against an allegation of
willfully maintaining a monopoly is that the economic
credentialing policy excludes physicians from the medical staff,
rather than controls or restricts the physician market. As noted
by one court, a hospital would be more likely to “maximize its
revenues by giving staff privileges to every qualified doctor who
applied.”73  By contrast, a policy that is intended to exclude
physicians from the medical staff “is likely to weaken [a





hospital’s] monopoly position in the long run, since a potential
rival . . . would have an incentive to provide competing services
for the [physicians] excluded.”74  That argument might support
a conclusion that the hospital was not monopolizing the
market vis à vis other full-service, acute-care community hospi-
tals. But physicians typically do not wish to open full-service
hospitals, but rather specialty hospitals. Therefore, a court
could hold that a policy expressly prohibiting physicians from
owning or investing in competing facilities unlawfully impairs
the operation of and erects a barrier to entry for such specialty
hospitals.
A hospital also could argue that its board adopted an economic
conflict-of-interest policy based on a reasonable business judg-
ment that the hospital would rather lose potential patient
referrals from excluded physicians than allow such physicians
to cherry pick profitable patients. Such a rationale would not
suggest an intent to willfully maintain monopoly power and,
therefore, could defeat a Section 2 antitrust challenge.
3. Decisions Upholding Antitrust Challenges to Economic
Conflict-of-Interest Policies and Practices
Despite courts’ tolerance for certain types of economic
credentialing policies, such as exclusive contract or closed staff
arrangements75  and policies intended to promote efficiency,76
courts appear less willing to uphold policies based on physi-
cians’ membership in competing organizations, admission of
patients to competing facilities, or ownership interests in com-
peting healthcare facilities. One purpose of antitrust law is to
maximize consumer welfare by policing practices that tend to
restrict competition. Accordingly, a policy that protects a
hospital’s revenue stream by conditioning medical staff privi-
leges on physicians restricting or refraining from competition
in the relevant healthcare market presents a particular risk of
liability under antitrust law. Hospitals have begun to adopt
such policies only recently; therefore, there are relatively few
cases directly addressing the antitrust and other issues raised by
such policies. The following cases illustrate that courts may be
willing to uphold antitrust challenges to such inherently
anticompetitive credentialing policies, even though courts gen-
erally reject antitrust challenges to more benign, or “tradi-
tional,” forms of economic credentialing.
First, in Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,77  the court upheld an
antitrust claim brought by a physician, a hospital, and two
insurance companies owned by the hospital against Blue Cross





and Blue Shield of Kansas (Blue Cross Kansas). The complaint
alleged that Blue Cross threatened to terminate the hospital’s
contracting provider agreement because of the hospital’s affilia-
tion with competing insurers. The plaintiffs alleged that this
threatened termination had the effect of making other hospitals
reluctant to affiliate with Blue Cross Kansas’s competitors, thereby
reducing competition in the health insurance market and pre-
venting healthcare consumers from enjoying the benefits of
competition. The jury agreed with the plaintiffs, and the appeals
court upheld the verdict.78
Similarly, in Potters Medical Center v. City Hospital Ass‘n,79  the
court held that restricting a physician’s ability to practice at
competing facilities may constitute monopolization. Potters,
an acute-care hospital, together with a diagnostic imaging
center and a minor emergency clinic, brought an antitrust
action against City Hospital, the only other acute-care hospital
in the geographic area. The complaint alleged that that City
Hospital refused to grant staff privileges to doctors with Potters’
privileges and engaged in various intimidation and pressuring
tactics to discourage physician competition. The court denied
the defendants’ request to dismiss the complaint because there
was adequate evidence of anticompetitive intent and other
elements of an antitrust violation.80
Likewise, in Miller v. Indiana Hospital,81  the court allowed a
surgeon’s antitrust claim to reach a jury. The court concluded
that there was sufficient evidence that a hospital unreasonably
terminated a surgeon’s staff privileges when the surgeon opened
a competing facility and that the termination of privileges was
not due to professional incompetence as alleged by the hospi-
tal.82  Several years after obtaining staff privileges at the hospi-
tal, the surgeon opened a five-office medical building (including
physicians’ offices, an on-site laboratory, and radiology ser-
vices) two miles away from the hospital. A few years after the
surgeon opened the medical office building, the hospital termi-
nated his staff privileges, ostensibly because of inadequate care
provided to one patient who died at the hospital. The surgeon
alleged that the hospital actually revoked his staff privileges to
stifle competition from his facility. Based on affidavits of former
hospital administrators revealing the hospital’s concern over
competition from the surgeon’s facility, evidence that the medical
staff encouraged other practitioners to break their contracts with the
surgeon’s facility, and evidence that physicians who committed
more serious infractions regarding patient care were not terminated,
the court declined to dismiss the antitrust action.83





Also, in Blue Cross v. Kitsap Physicians Service,84  the court granted
Blue Cross of Washington and Alaska’s (Blue Cross Washington’s)
request for a preliminary injunction to stop Kitsap Physicians
Service (KPS), the dominant health insurer in the area, from
enforcing an amendment to its bylaws that would have denied
membership to any physician who contracted with a health
maintenance organization (HMO) that utilized a “closed panel”
of physicians. Blue Cross Washington alleged that KPS adopted
the bylaw as a defensive measure to remain competitive with Blue
Cross Washington. The court concluded that KPS enjoyed sub-
stantial market share and that the bylaw amendment had an
anticompetitive effect by obstructing Blue Cross Washington’s
ability to attract physicians to its plan.85
In justifying its bylaw under a rule of reason analysis, KPS
argued that the Blue Cross Washington closed-panel policy itself
adversely affected competition because it created a conflict of
interest for physicians who belonged to both the KPS plan, a fee-
for-service arrangement, and the Blue Cross Washington HMO.
KPS asserted that physicians participating in both plans would
have an incentive to steer healthy patients to the Blue Cross
Washington plan and more needy patients to the KPS plan,
which would cause KPS’s costs (and rates) to rise. The court
determined that if such steering occurred, it would not produce
anticompetitive effects, but rather, “the very type of competitive
pressure that the HMO concept seeks to introduce.”86  In the
court’s estimation, healthier patients should be drawn to HMOs,
which offer lower prices, instead of fee-for-service arrangements,
under which they subsidize less healthy patients. Although one
could quibble with the court’s analysis of the economic incen-
tives under various medical insurance models, the Kitsap decision
is significant because it considered and rejected a cherry-picking
argument analogous to the one that hospitals may make regard-
ing medical staff members’ economic conflicts of interest.
These cases demonstrate courts’ willingness to strike down
credentialing policies that have the intent or inherent effect of
restricting competition in the relevant healthcare market. Al-
though protection of competition for competition’s sake is not
the primary purpose of antitrust laws, a court might allow an
antitrust challenge to a hospital’s credentialing policy that
specifically prohibits or restricts medical staff members from
competing with the hospital. Such a policy could harm consum-
ers by limiting the availability, reducing the quality, or increasing
the cost of healthcare services.





4. Decisions Supporting a Hospital’s Right to Exclude
Physicians Based on Conflicts of Interest
The rule of reason analysis calls for courts to weigh the
anticompetitive effects of a particular business practice against
the pro-competitive benefits of the practice. Accordingly, in
deciding an antitrust challenge to a hospital’s credentialing
policy that excludes physicians who have economic conflicts of
interest, a court could conclude that such a policy does not
violate antitrust law if the hospital offers a legitimate business
justification. Cases decided on antitrust grounds, as well as cases
decided in other contexts based on economic policies and
principles of competition, have recognized a hospital’s need to
maintain economic viability as a legitimate business justifica-
tion for economic credentialing.
As discussed, the Mahan87  court held that a hospital’s interest in
protecting itself from competition was a sufficient business
justification for restricting staff privileges on a breach of con-
tract challenge to the bylaws. Such reasoning could be bor-
rowed in the antitrust context. In Mahan, a group of orthopedic
surgeons built an orthopedic surgery center that directly com-
peted with the hospital. The hospital board responded by
adopting a closed staff policy with respect to three specific
spinal procedures and all new applicants for orthopedic surgery
privileges. After being denied staff privileges, Dr. Mahan sued
the hospital claiming the closed staff policy was anticompetitive
and constituted a breach of the medical staff bylaws.88  The
Supreme Court of South Dakota concluded that the hospital’s
closed staff policy was necessary to “insure the continued
viability of the hospital.”89  The court upheld the policy because
the hospital board acted in good faith and within its authority
in adopting the policy.90  Mahan supports the proposition that
reducing or preventing competition that could threaten a
hospital’s ability to remain operational may be a valid exercise
of the hospital board’s management power, even if such policy
has anticompetitive effects. In a footnote, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota recognized the conflict of interest inherent in
physicians owning competing healthcare facilities:
How can a doctor who is a part owner of the for-
profit [orthopedic surgery group] be expected to
fulfill his or her duties toward his or her co-owners
and in the same instance fulfill the duties towards
the [the hospital], who is a not for profit hospital?
This does not imply ill-will on the part of the doc-





tor, it simply faces fundamental medical issues such
as at which institution does the doctor place his or
her patients . . . ? We have often stated that an
agent cannot serve two masters. This rule applies
to medical professionals as well.91
Accordingly, Mahan seems to recognize that a hospital policy
which restricts or prohibits physicians’ ownership or invest-
ment in competing entities could be viewed as being supported
by a valid business justification because there is no other way to
ensure that physicians remain loyal to the hospital and avoid
the temptation to cherry pick patients.
The Mahan decision is significant for its strong deference to the
hospital board’s authority to protect the hospital from com-
petitive market forces. The court was persuaded that the hospi-
tal provided essential medical care to the Aberdeen community,
which services might be unavailable if the hospital were forced
to close. Accordingly, the court concluded that “[the hospital]
surely has the power to attempt to insure [its] economic sur-
vival.”92  The court did not adequately explain, however, why
the community demand for such medical services could not be
filled by another, perhaps more efficient, healthcare provider.
Also recognizing a healthcare provider’s legitimate interest in
maintaining economic viability, a New York court in NYSARC,
Inc. v. Syed,93  upheld a noncompete clause in a contract between
a nonprofit medical clinic and a physician. The court noted that
the medical clinic alleged “that enforcement of the covenant is
necessary to protect its legitimate interests because it is a not-
for-profit organization operating its clinic at a loss and because
the patient revenue is crucial to its ability to continue providing
services. If it loses patients who have insurance or can otherwise
afford to pay for services it will be unable to continue serving
those patients who cannot afford to pay for services.”94  NYSARC,
like Mahan, seems to recognize the quasi-public nature of healthcare
services and the multiple-payor cost-spreading methods by which
hospitals finance their services. In light of these factors, courts may
be more willing to uphold anticompetitive business practices in the
healthcare context than in other markets.
Other cases suggest that courts may be influenced by the unique
economics of healthcare financing and the considerable discre-
tionary power of hospital boards of directors when ruling on
challenges to economic conflict-of-interest credentialing poli-
cies. For example, in an unreported Florida decision, Rosenblum v.





Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center,95  the court squarely
addressed a hospital’s authority to exclude a physician based
solely on an economic conflict of interest. A nonprofit hospital
excluded the physician because he was head of the cardiology
department at a competing hospital. The physician sued, but
the court dismissed his claims, relying in part on language in a
Florida statute listing the criteria that a hospital may consider
in deciding whether to grant staff privileges, including “such
other elements as determined by the governing board.”96  The
court determined that “other elements” could include eco-
nomic conflicts of interest.97
Further, a recent case from Louisiana upheld a hospital’s poli-
cies that had the effect of limiting competition from a physi-
cian-owned facility because there was a valid business justifica-
tion for the policies.98  In Surgical Care Center v. Hospital Service
District No. 1, the court rejected the surgical center’s antitrust
challenge to various practices of the hospital, such as negotiat-
ing exclusive contracts with insurance companies, refusing
patient-transfer and blood-type-and-cross-match agreements
with the surgical center, refusing to lend equipment, and mak-
ing threats that could have deterred physicians from working at
the competing surgical center.99  The court concluded that these
practices either had no effect on the surgical center or were
justified as pro-competitive conduct.100  With respect to other
monopoly and tying claims, the court determined that the
plaintiffs failed to prove market power; therefore, the antitrust
claims failed.101
Another case has upheld the right of healthcare providers and
managed care insurance providers to negotiate exclusive con-
tracts. In Park Avenue Radiology Associates v. Methodist Health
Systems, Inc.,102  the court held that two physicians and their
outpatient radiology practice lacked standing to bring an anti-
trust challenge to the exclusive contract. The court noted that
exclusive contracts between providers and health plans that
offer discounts and other financial incentives to refer patients
to the provider are consistent with the selective nature of
managed care insurance plans, are pro-competitive, and have
the desirable effect of reducing healthcare costs.103
Also, in Lister v. Methodist Medical Center,104  the court upheld a
hospital’s closed staff policy for anesthesia services, noting: “[t]he
by-laws do not limit the hospital from taking actions which affect
the plaintiff’s staff privileges unrelated to competency or con-
duct. The parties concede that the hospital decided to terminate





plaintiff’s clinical privileges solely due to business considerations, an
entitled deference . . . .”105  Lister and the other cases discussed above
suggest that courts may be willing to accord considerable discre-
tion to hospitals with economic credentialing policies, even
when such policies have the inherent effect and evident purpose
of limiting competition.106  Maintaining economic viability and
ensuring delivery of needed healthcare services may justify an
otherwise impermissible restraint on trade.
Another argument available to defeat a monopolization chal-
lenge to an economic credentialing policy is the long-recog-
nized right of a trader or manufacturer freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal, in
the absence of any purpose to create a monopoly. Based on such
reasoning, the Fifth Circuit, in Martin v. Memorial Hospital,
rejected a physician’s monopoly challenge to a hospital’s exclu-
sive agreement governing staff privileges at the county’s only
authorized end stage renal disease (ESRD) units.107  At the time,
Mississippi law prohibited the operation of an ESRD unit
without first obtaining a certificate of need (CON) from the
state department of health. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport
(MHG) acquired control of both CONs issued by the state for
ESRD units and entered into an exclusive contract with a
physician under which only that physician, or the physician’s
designated representative, could perform chronic outpatient
dialysis in MHG’s ESRD units. An excluded nephrologist sued
MHG and its board of trustees, alleging violations of state
antitrust laws.108  The Fifth Circuit held that the exclusive
contract did not violate Mississippi’s anti-monopoly law be-
cause to hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the CON
statute, which clearly contemplated anticompetitive conduct.109
These cases provide potential arguments that a hospital could
use to defeat a physician’s antitrust challenge to an economic
conflict-of-interest policy. Even if the hospital possesses market
power, the hospital may be able to demonstrate that the
anticompetitive effects of the economic credentialing policy are
outweighed by pro-competitive benefits or legitimate business
justifications for the policy. In particular, these cases demon-
strate that courts tend to defer to hospital management regard-
ing efficiency and other operational matters. Specifically, a
hospital’s need to maintain economic viability and a patient mix
that includes high-reimbursement cases to offset low-reimburse-
ment or indigent care cases could justify a policy that limits or
prohibits competition by medical staff members. Such policies,
however, are inherently anticompetitive because they force phy-





sicians to limit or forego certain entrepreneurial or investment
activities in order to maintain full staff privileges at a general,
acute-care facility, which arguably are essential for most physi-
cians’ practices.110  Accordingly, courts could deem hospitals’ new
economic credentialing policies to constitute illegal methods of
maintaining monopoly power or barring new entry. The inci-
dence of hospitals adopting policies to limit or prohibit competi-
tion by their medical staff members is likely to increase, as both
physicians and hospitals address problems of declining revenue.
Therefore, additional challenges to these policies likely will be
brought, and the antitrust case law regarding such policies will
continue to evolve.
B. Due Process Challenges
The decision to deny or terminate a physician’s staff privileges
based on an economic conflict of interest also raises issues
regarding the physician’s entitlement to procedural due pro-
cess. A physician who is effectively prevented from providing
services at a hospital at which he possesses staff privileges
because of the existence of a policy that conditions staff privi-
leges on his refraining from competition with the hospital may
allege that the hospital failed to provide procedural due process
before reducing or revoking his privileges. In other words, must
a hospital give a physician an individual hearing before enforc-
ing an economic credentialing policy, or may the board adopt
such a policy as an administrative matter, without providing a
hearing or other due process to physicians whose clinical privi-
leges are affected by the new policy? These due process argu-
ments may arise under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution or under state law.
Even if a hospital is not required to provide an individual hearing
and other procedural due process rights to a physician affected
by an economic credentialing policy, the hospital should con-
sider giving the physician due process protection to take advan-
tage of the immunity provisions under the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act (HCQIA).111  Hospitals and peer review partici-
pants are immune from liability for monetary damages for
conducting professional review activities if certain HCQIA re-
quirements, including adequate notice and hearing, are met.112
Thus, despite the time, energy, and expense potentially required
to provide individual hearings for all physicians affected by an
economic credentialing policy, it may be worth the trouble for a
hospital to do so.





1. Right to a Hearing
Physicians who lose staff privileges as a result of a hospital
implementing an economic conflict-of-interest policy may ar-
gue that the policy violates their constitutional rights. The acts
of public hospitals are considered “state actions” and, therefore,
must comport with the provisions of the United States Consti-
tution.113  Specifically, excluded physicians may argue that the
hospital violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause
by terminating their medical staff privileges without a hearing.
It is well established that a physician has no constitutional
right to staff privileges at a hospital, public or private, “merely
because he is licensed to practice medicine.”114  “A hospital is not
a mere hostery [sic] providing room and board and a place for
physicians to practice their craft . . . .” 115  Once a physician has
been granted staff privileges, however, those privileges are a
property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.116
Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause, a person’s
“property or liberty may not be permanently diminished or
abrogated without first being accorded that procedural protec-
tion designed to ensure a principled and even-handed examina-
tion of the basis for any such deprivation.”117  Accordingly, a
public hospital may be required to grant a physician “some kind
of hearing” before terminating his medical staff privileges.118  In
addition, some state statutes require hospitals to accord certain
due process or hearing rights to physicians before denying or
revoking staff privileges.119  Under such statutes, private as well
as public hospitals may be required to provide some due process
protections before implementing a policy that impairs or termi-
nates a physician’s medical staff privileges.120
Nevertheless, a number of courts hold that due process rights are
not triggered by a hospital adopting a generally applicable,
nondiscriminatory administrative policy that has the effect of
denying or revoking a physician’s staff privileges.121  Specifi-
cally, courts may hold that exclusive contract arrangements or
other economic credentialing policies do not give rise to the full
panoply of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. Some
courts have concluded that the underlying rationale for hold-
ing a hearing is not present when the hospital’s decision was
not based on a particular physician’s professional competence
or unethical conduct.122  In other words, implementation of a
hospital policy may be deemed an administrative or “quasi-
legislative” decision for which a judicial-type hearing is not
required.123  As one court noted: “[N]either a private nor public
hospital may unreasonably or arbitrarily exclude a physician





otherwise qualified from membership on its staff. However, it
does not necessarily follow that the governing authority of a
hospital may not make a policy decision or adopt a rule of
general application . . . .”124
Recently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals, in City of Cookeville ex
rel. Cookeville Regional Medical Center v. Humphrey,125  departed
from established precedent of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
and held that due process was not implicated by a hospital
credentialing policy. The Humphrey court held that, under a new
state statute, a public hospital was not required to accord due
process rights to radiologists whose staff privileges were affected
by the hospital entering into an exclusive contract for radio-
logical services. In 1996, the Tennessee General Assembly ex-
pressly authorized hospitals to enter into exclusive contracts
“regardless of the competitive consequences thereof.”126  In
Humphrey, the trial court ruled in favor of the hospital, but failed
to address the Supreme Court of Tennessee’s 1991 decision in
Lewisburg Community Hospital, Inc. v. Alfredson,127  which held
that a physician whose staff privileges were significantly re-
duced by a hospital’s exclusive contract arrangement had a
contractual right to a hearing pursuant to the hospital’s bylaws.
The trial court instead “followed the apparently universal rule
applied in other jurisdictions, which is contra to Alfredson.”128
In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals discussed and
cited various decisions from other jurisdictions regarding due
process rights in relation to exclusive contract arrangements.129
The court also discussed the legislative history of the new
statute, which recognized that the healthcare market
is rapidly changing as is the way and manner in
which such services are purchased and delivered;
that the market for hospital and health care ser-
vices is becoming increasingly competitive; and
that the hospital and other health care providers
need flexibility to be able to respond to changing
conditions by having the power to develop effi-
cient and cost-effective methods to provide for
hospital, medical and health care needs.130
In light of the new statute, the weight of authority from other
jurisdictions, and the emerging healthcare market factors,
Humphrey concluded that it was not bound by Alfredson.131
Accordingly, Humphrey recognized the reasonableness of the
hospital’s exclusive contract arrangement and held that four





radiologists whose medical staff privileges were affected by the
hospital’s decision to enter into an exclusive contract with a
different radiology group were not entitled to individual hear-
ings. The reasoning in Humphrey, like the reasoning in the
antitrust and other “business justification” cases, demonstrates
judicial recognition of the unique economic factors and in-
creasing competition faced by hospitals. Accordingly, courts
may give hospital management more leeway to adopt policies
intended to shield the hospital from the vicissitudes of the
competitive marketplace than they would give management of
a different type of business entity. The result of this deference in
the due process context is that hospitals may be relieved of the
burden of giving excluded physicians individual hearings or
other procedural protections.
Courts have also held that due process is not required when
hospitals adopt economic credentialing policies because such
policies did not actually affect physicians’ staff privileges. In
Adler v. Montefiore Hospital Ass‘n,132  the court held that a part-
time physician at a public teaching hospital did not have a
constitutional right to a hearing when the hospital adopted a
policy allowing only full-time physicians to use the cardiac
catheterization laboratory. The court concluded that the
physician’s “rights to admit patients and to prescribe treat-
ment, and the remainder of the cluster of privileges accorded to
all staff members, have in no way been diminished, but remain in
all respects equal to those of other staff members.”133  Thus, a hearing
was not required. The decision, however, ignores the reality that
denying a physician access to facilities or equipment central to his
area of specialty, such as a catheterization laboratory to a cardiolo-
gist, has the practical effect of denying privileges.
Similarly, in Faucher v. Rodziewicz,134  the court concluded that
no actual termination of staff privileges occurred when a public
hospital adopted a policy that made a physician’s services less
valuable but did not actually terminate her staff privileges. The
physician had been providing anesthesiology services under an
exclusive contract with the hospital for several years. The
hospital decided to hire a clinical director and asked the anes-
thesiologist to apply for the new position. She declined, object-
ing strongly to certain terms of the contract. The hospital then
hired a new clinical director, but not under an exclusive contract.
The original anesthesiologist’s staff privileges were not affected
by this staffing change. The clinical director, however, imple-
mented a policy requiring surgeons to give twenty-four-hours
notice if they wished to use the services of the original anesthesi-





ologist, which made her services less valuable than before the
notice policy was implemented.135  Under these facts, the court
concluded that no termination of staff privileges had occurred
and that the anesthesiologist’s “real claim is that the economic
value of her medical staff privileges decreased” after the new
clinical director was hired.136  The constitutional right to a hear-
ing was not triggered because the economic value was not a
property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
A hospital might rely on the Adler and Faucher line of reasoning
to defend a due process challenge to an economic conflict-of-
interest policy that restricts, rather than denies, staff privileges
of competing medical staff members. The hospital could argue
that the policy does not actually revoke or even reduce a
physician’s staff privileges, even though it may have an eco-
nomic effect on him by requiring the physician to forego
investment or entrepreneurial opportunities in another, unre-
lated healthcare facility. Constitutional Due Process is not
implicated when there is no loss of liberty or property.
By contrast, the court in Northeast Georgia Radiological Associates
v. Tidwell137  held that a hearing was required for a physician
affected by an exclusive contract arrangement at a public hospi-
tal.138  The hospital had an exclusive contract with one radio-
logical group, but decided to terminate that contract and enter
into a new exclusive contract with a different group. The
radiologist who wholly owned the excluded group sued, alleg-
ing breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and
deprivation of constitutional rights. On the Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim, the court concluded that the radiologist was en-
titled to a hearing before termination of his staff privileges
because his radiological group’s exclusive contract expressly
provided that it could be terminated only “for cause.”139  The
Tidwell court did not consider the argument relied on by Adler
and Faucher that the radiologist’s staff privileges were merely
affected by an administrative policy decision, as opposed to a
decision bearing on the radiologist’s professional competency
or ethics.
The different reasoning and result in Tidwell may be explained by
the unique facts of the hospital terminating one exclusive con-
tract, without cause, in favor of another exclusive contract. A
court might be more likely to view a hospital’s decision to
implement an exclusive contract arrangement for the first time
as an administrative policy decision, as opposed to a decision to





terminate an established exclusive contract, without cause, in
order to enter a new exclusive contract with a different provider.
The latter decision by a hospital board more directly implicates
the individual property rights of the physicians in the now-
excluded group.140  Although Faucher also involved termination
of an exclusive contract in favor of a new staffing arrangement,
the facts are distinguishable since the anesthesiologist was
given the option of applying for the new position and did not
actually lose her staff privileges.
Relatively few cases have addressed the due process implications
of economic conflict-of-interest policies. The decisions regard-
ing traditional economic credentialing policies, however, gen-
erally conclude that a physician whose property interest in
medical staff privileges is affected by an administrative decision
of the hospital does not have a right to an individual hearing.141
As such, a court is likely to conclude that a new economic
credentialing policy that limits or prohibits medical staff mem-
bers from owning or investing in competing facilities does not
implicate due process or other constitutional rights. A court will
find either that the policy does not actually deprive a current
medical staff member of privileges or that it was adopted as a
quasi-legislative or administrative decision, rather than as an
adjudication of a particular physician’s professional compe-
tency or ethics.
Moreover, as the Tennessee Court of Appeals noted in Humphrey,
the weight of authority in jurisdictions across the country holds
that hospitals, public or private, are not required to accord due
process hearing rights to physicians whose staff privileges are
affected by generally applicable administrative policies.142  The
Humphrey decision is noteworthy because it turned, in part, on
recognition of the increasing competitive pressures on hospi-
tals in the current healthcare market and the need to give
hospital administrators the flexibility to respond to those pres-
sures. Therefore, if a physician challenges an economic conflict-
of-interest policy on due process grounds for deprivation of
property, a court would probably conclude that the affected
physician does not have a constitutional right to a hearing.
2. HCQIA Immunity
Even if a hospital is not required by the United States Constitu-
tion or state law to provide due process to a medical staff
member who is affected by a new economic credentialing
policy, there remains a strong incentive to do so. This incentive is





the result of HCQIA,143  under which hospitals are immune from
liability for monetary damages for conducting professional re-
view activities.144  An economic conflict-of-interest policy that
results in loss of staff privileges by a particular physician could be
deemed a professional review action under HCQIA. A specific
exception, however, appears to remove economic conflict-of-
interest credentialing policies from the ambit of the statute.
Congress enacted HCQIA in 1986 to address concerns over
increasing incidents of medical malpractice and an overall
nationwide decline in the quality of healthcare.145  Congress
determined that these problems “warrant greater efforts than
those that can be undertaken by any individual State.”146
HCQIA requires hospitals and certain other healthcare entities
that conduct peer review activities to report physicians who lose
staff privileges or are otherwise subject to a decision “adversely
affecting”147  their staff privileges to a national data bank.148  The
National Practitioner Data Bank is intended to prevent incom-
petent physicians from moving from state to state.149  To encour-
age hospitals to review healthcare professionals’ qualifications
and to report to the data bank, HCQIA grants immunity to
hospitals for these activities.
The HCQIA reporting requirement and immunity provisions
apply only to “professional review actions” taken by hospitals
and other specific healthcare entities:
The term “professional review action” means an
action or recommendation of a professional re-
view body which is taken or made in the conduct
of professional review activity, which is based on
the competence or professional conduct of an indi-
vidual physician (which conduct affects or could
affect adversely the health or welfare of a patient
or patients), and which affects (or may affect) ad-
versely the clinical privileges[150 ]. . . of the physi-
cian. Such term includes a formal decision of a
professional review body not to take an action or
make a recommendation described in the previous
sentence and also includes professional review ac-
tivities relating to a professional review action.151
Specific exceptions exist under the statute. One exception pro-
vides that “an action is not considered to be based on the
competence or professional conduct of a physician if the action
is primarily based on . . . the physician’s fees or the physician’s





advertising or engaging in other competitive acts intended to solicit or
retain business.”152  Under this definition, HCQIA may not apply
when a physician’s staff privileges are affected by a hospital’s
credentialing policy that prohibits or limits physician ownership
or investment in competing businesses. This is true because the
action would be based on the physician’s engaging in competi-
tive acts, not on his competence or professional conduct.153
If a hospital’s economic credentialing decision is considered a
professional review action, however, the hospital would want
to avail itself of HCQIA immunity. Under HCQIA, immunity is
presumed if the hospital meets certain requirements. Specifi-
cally, the professional review action must be taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was
taken in the furtherance of quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable opportunity to obtain the
facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures
are afforded to the physician involved or after
such other procedures as are fair to the physi-
cian under the circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was
warranted by the facts known after such rea-
sonable effort to obtain facts and after meet-
ing the requirements of paragraph (3).154
Once the hospital establishes a presumption of immunity by
satisfying these elements, the burden shifts to the physician to
overcome the presumption that the hospital complied with the
HCQIA requirements.155
The above elements of HCQIA immunity may be met fairly easily
by hospitals, especially considering that the physician bears the
burden to show the hospital’s actions were objectively unreason-
able.156  Thus, if the implementation of an economic credentialing
policy is deemed a “professional review action,” a hospital would
have a strong incentive to afford affected physicians with at least
minimal procedural protections in order to avail its peer review
committee members of immunity from liability.
C. Breach of Contract Challenges
Physicians who lose their staff privileges as a result of a hospital’s
adopting a policy that prohibits or restricts them from engag-
ing in activities that compete with the hospital also may allege





that the new policy constitutes a breach of contract. A physician
may argue that the medical staff bylaws create a contract between
the physician and the hospital and that the physician has a
contractual right to retain his privileges unless those privileges
are removed according to the procedures set forth in the bylaws.
For example, if the bylaws allow termination of a medical staff
member only for quality-of-care reasons, a physician might allege
that economic conflicts of interest are not related to quality of
care. Termination of staff privileges on such grounds, therefore,
would constitute a breach of contract.
If the bylaws specify certain due process or hearing procedures
that must be followed before staff privileges are terminated, a
physician might allege that the new economic credentialing
policy effectively terminated his staff privileges without proper
notice and hearing. Adoption of the policy, therefore, consti-
tutes a breach. A physician might also allege that the board
breached the bylaws by adopting the policy unilaterally with-
out medical staff involvement. For these breach of contract
arguments to succeed, a court first would have to conclude that
the hospital bylaws constitute a contract between the hospital and
physician. Some courts have concluded that bylaws are contracts,157
while other courts have concluded that they are not.158  Even courts
in the same state do not always agree on this issue.159
The physician’s claim in Mahan160  was based on breach of
contract. The court concluded that there was no breach because
the hospital’s implementation of a closed staff policy was a
decision soundly within the discretion of the hospital board of
directors.161  The physicians alleged that the medical staff bylaws
trumped the decisionmaking power of the board as to all
decisions relating in any way to, or incidentally affecting,
medical personnel issues. Thus, any decision by the board in
violation of the medical staff bylaws was allegedly a breach of
contract.162  The court acknowledged that the medical staff by-
laws gave the medical staff authority to evaluate the professional
competence of applicants for staff privileges.163  The court, how-
ever, clarified that medical staff bylaws derive from corporate
bylaws, much as statutes derive from a constitution.164  Therefore,
the medical staff has no authority over any corporate decision
unless the corporate bylaws or state law specifically grant such
authority.165  The court concluded that no such power had been
granted to the Avera St. Luke’s medical staff; therefore, the
board’s decision to close its orthopedic staff was a “reasonable
administrative decision,” within the authority of the board under
the corporate bylaws.166  Thus, there was no breach of contract





under the medical staff bylaws, even though the decision inci-
dentally affected the medical staff.
Some courts, such as a Missouri court in Zipper v. Health Mid-
west,167  have not parsed the distinction between corporate
bylaws and medical staff bylaws to the same extent as Mahan.
These courts have concluded on more straightforward contract
law reasoning that medical staff bylaws do not constitute a
contract because there is no consideration and no bargained-for
exchange.168  Accordingly, “[t]he exclusion of a physician or
surgeon from practicing in a private hospital is a matter that
rests in the discretion of the managing authorities.”169  The
Zipper court concluded: “The hospital retains authority to
restrict or revoke a staff member’s privileges by reasonable and
nondiscriminatory rules and regulations.”170  In another case
examining Missouri law, Madsen v. Audrain Health Care Inc.,171
the Eighth Circuit rejected a physician’s breach of contract
claim under the medical staff bylaws because “[t]he medical
staff bylaws were not incorporated into the [p]hysician
[a]greement” and, therefore, were not a part of such contract.172
The court concluded that mere reference in the physician agree-
ment to the medical staff bylaws does not make the entirety of
those bylaws part of the contract. In addition, the court noted
that the state’s expressed policy is “the assurance of quality
health care, which is unduly impinged by allowing a physician
to seek damages for an alleged failure of a hospital to follow the
procedures established by its bylaws.”173
Other courts, by contrast, have held that the medical staff
bylaws do constitute a contract between the hospital and the
medical staff. When a court concludes that medical staff bylaws
constitute a contract between the hospital and a medical staff
member, a physician’s breach of contract claim premised on
failure to comply with the due process procedures outlined in
the bylaws likely will be treated in a manner analogous to
constitutional or statutory due process claims. That is, due
process will not be required for generally applicable administra-
tive decisions by a hospital.174  Breach of contract claims based
on other provisions of the bylaws may be unsuccessful as well, as
long as the hospital can show that the economic conflict of
interest policy is a reasonable, non-arbitrary exercise of hospital
management authority, rather than a decision pertaining to
medical staff personnel issues falling within the medical staff’s
authority.175  A more troubling implication of a court’s holding
that the medical staff bylaws are a contract is that the hospital
board may be unable to unilaterally amend the bylaws to adopt a





new credentialing policy without the participation and approval
of the medical staff.176  Such a holding presents a potential
impediment to the board’s action, because economic conflict-of-
interest credentialing policies are likely to be unpopular with the
medical staff.
D. Summary of Legal Challenges
Antitrust challenges to hospital credentialing policies, includ-
ing exclusive contract or closed staff arrangements, generally
have not been successful, even though such policies are inher-
ently exclusionary. Courts have accepted hospitals’ legitimate
business justifications for these policies, such as increasing
efficiency, maintaining control over hospital operations, en-
suring availability of services, and improving quality of care.
Recent cases suggest that courts may be more receptive to
antitrust challenges to new economic credentialing policies
that are expressly intended to prevent medical staff members
from competing with hospitals at which they have privileges.
Other cases, including cases outside the antitrust context that
relied on market factors, suggest that courts might uphold such
policies in order to ensure the continued economic viability of
community hospitals and essential medical care. Such an out-
come seems especially likely if the court views the purpose of
antitrust laws as maximizing consumer welfare in the broader
social sense, rather than the narrower economic sense. Similar
recognition of the increasingly competitive nature of healthcare
delivery and hospital management’s authority to operate the
facility could persuade courts to allow hospitals to implement
economic credentialing policies as a matter of administrative
policy, without imposing the burdens of providing individual
due process. Nevertheless, a hospital should consider providing
at least minimal due process when adopting such a policy in
order to gain immunity from liability. Finally, the case law
discussing medical staff bylaws as contracts between hospitals
and medical staff members presents additional challenges to
hospitals adopting and enforcing these new economic
credentialing policies.
III. Other Considerations
In addition to the legal challenges that hospitals may face from
physicians who are affected by credentialing policies that limit
or prohibit competition, these new policies raise novel issues
under federal healthcare program statutes, state laws on cov-
enants not to compete, federal tax law on exempt organiza-





tions, and hospital operations regarding management of medi-
cal staff and public relations.
A. Federal Healthcare Statutes
Hospitals considering adopting policies to protect themselves
from competition by medical staff should carefully consider the
potential risks of civil or criminal sanctions under the Anti-
Kickback Statute177  and the Stark Law.178  If a federal regulator or
court determines that hospital staff privileges constitute “remu-
neration” from the hospital to the physician or establish a
financial relationship between the hospital and physician,
these statutes could be implicated. Organizations representing
physicians, on one side, and hospitals, on the other, have taken
strong opposing views in this current debate.
In December of 1999, the AMA, in an eleven-page letter, for-
mally requested that the United States Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG)
issue a fraud alert to warn hospitals and physicians of the
implications of economic credentialing practices, such as hos-
pital-imposed exclusivity policies and prohibitions on affilia-
tions with competing entities. The AMA warned that “the
potential for damage with exclusive credentialing is greater
than in many other kickback situations.”179  The AMA also
adopted a policy strongly opposing hospitals’ basing staff privi-
leging decisions on economic criteria unrelated to patient care
or professional competency.180  According to the AMA, the OIG
has sought additional information from the AMA regarding
various types of economic credentialing practices. In addition,
the OIG has repeatedly expressed a commitment to review the
issue and to involve the AMA in any draft alert that is issued.181
The OIG has responded to the AMA’s concerns by soliciting
public comments regarding the legality of economic
credentialing policies under federal fraud and abuse laws, spe-
cifically the Anti-kickback Statute.182  Although the OIG has
received substantial comments from groups on both sides of the
issue, it remains unclear what its final position will be.
1. Anti-Kickback Statute
The federal illegal remuneration statute, commonly referred to
as the Anti-Kickback Statute, prohibits the offer, payment,
solicitation, or receipt of any remuneration, directly or indi-
rectly, covertly or overtly, in cash or in kind: (1) in return for the
referral of patients, or arranging for the referral of patients, for
the provision of items or services for which payment may be





made under any federally funded healthcare program, other than
the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program; or (2) in return for
the purchase, lease, or order, or arranging for the purchase, lease,
or order, of any good, facility, service or item for which payment
may be made under federal healthcare programs.183
The OIG has asked, as a threshold matter, whether staff privi-
leges should be considered “remuneration,” given the current
managed care climate, in which access to patients may depend
on a physician having privileges at the proper hospital.184  In
particular, the OIG asked: “Should the determination whether
staff privileges have monetary value turn on the particular
factual circumstances (e.g., in a given market does access to
privileges have a demonstrable monetary value)?”185  The OIG
also requested comments on the cherry picking problem, or, in
the OIG’s words, the “implications of a hospital’s denial of
privileges to a physician who competes with the hospital.”186
The OIG noted that “[t]hese physicians may be in a position to
steer profitable business or patients to their own competing
business through their control of referrals.”187  Further, the OIG
noted that several credentialing practices of which it is aware
appear to “raise substantial risks under the anti-kickback stat-
ute (i.e., privileges are conditioned on a sufficient flow of
referred business).”188  The OIG also asked: “Can privileges ever
be conditioned on referrals, other than minimums necessary for
clinical proficiency?”189  Although the OIG’s Federal Register
issuance is merely a request for public comments, the nature and
slant of the questions suggest that federal regulators have
reason to believe that economic credentialing policies could
violate the Anti-Kickback Statute or other federal laws.
On the OIG’s threshold question, credentialing alone should
not be viewed as “remuneration” because of the permissive
nature of medical staff privileges, which allow, but do not
require, a physician to use hospital facilities.190  The fact that a
physician is granted privileges at a particular hospital does not
obligate him to direct any patients to or generate any revenue
for the hospital. Staff privileges, therefore, should not be “remu-
neration” within the meaning of the Anti-Kickback Statute.
Accordingly, an economic conflict-of-interest policy that con-
ditions medical staff membership on a physician’s agreeing to
refrain from owning or investing in a competitive facility
should not be considered remunerative as long as there is no
referral requirement. Such a policy, as a practical matter, could—
and may even be intended to—increase the hospital’s revenue
by limiting the presence of competing healthcare facilities. But





that effect does not mean that the hospital is offering remunera-
tion, in the form of staff privileges, in exchange for patient
referrals. By contrast, a hospital policy that conditions privi-
leges on the physician’s agreeing to direct his patients to the
hospital rather than a physician-owned facility, more easily
could be viewed as offering or paying the physician remunera-
tion in the form of staff privileges in exchange for referring
patients to the hospital.
2. Stark Law
The Stark Law provides that if a physician (or a family member
of the physician) has a financial relationship with an entity:
(1) the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the
furnishing of designated health services191  paid for by Medicare
and Medicaid; and (2) the entity may not bill Medicare or
Medicaid for designated health services furnished pursuant to a
prohibited referral.192  A financial relationship may be an own-
ership interest (through debt, equity, or otherwise) or a compen-
sation arrangement, and may be direct or indirect.193  The
referral and billing restrictions are inapplicable if the arrange-
ment qualifies for an exception.194  The statutory sanctions are
applicable to both the referring physicians and the entity
billing for the designated health service.195  In sum, to establish a
violation under the Stark Law, the following three factors are
required: (1) the existence of a financial relationship between a
physician and an entity; (2) a referral of a Medicare or Medicaid
patient by the physician to the entity for a designated health
service; and (3) the absence of an exception.
Despite the AMA’s intimations, economic conflict of interest
credentialing policies do not appear to implicate the Stark Law.
Primarily, the first element of a Stark Law violation does not
seem to be met because the competing physicians do not have a
financial relationship with the hospital, the entity facing a
potential Stark violation. Instead, the physicians have a finan-
cial relationship with their competing specialty facilities or
clinics.196  A prohibited referral for Stark Law purposes requires
the physician to have an economic interest in the entity to
which he is referring. As such, the only way that the Stark Law
would be implicated by an economic credentialing policy is if staff
privileges themselves are deemed to constitute such an economic
interest. Just as hospital privileges should not be viewed as “remu-
neration” for purposes of the Anti-Kickback Statute, they should not
be considered to create a financial relationship between a hospital
and a physician under the Stark Law.





Employing somewhat unclear reasoning, some interested parties
have suggested that restrictions on competition, such as
noncompetition clauses and covenants not to compete in
physician contracts, could be called into question by the Stark
Law.197  In an earlier rulemaking discussion, the OIG resolved
such concerns and confirmed that covenants not to compete do
not necessarily implicate the Stark Law. The OIG should adopt a
similar position in the analogous context of hospital
credentialing policies that prohibit competition by medical
staff members.
In the preamble to the Stark regulations,198  OIG acknowledged
the concerns of some commentators that the way in which the
OIG proposed to interpret the “volume or value” requirement of
many of the Stark Law exceptions199  could implicate the legality
or enforceability of covenants not to compete. One criterion of
certain Stark Law exceptions is that the charges, consideration,
or compensation are not determined in a manner that takes
into account the volume or value of any referrals or other
business generated between the physician and the other party
to the contract. The commentators were concerned that the
OIG’s proposed interpretation of the “volume or value” stan-
dard as including fixed payments tied to referrals could ad-
versely impact covenants not to compete. The OIG found the
commentators’ reasoning for this concern “unclear,” but con-
firmed that a noncompete clause is distinguishable from a
policy requiring a physician to refer a certain volume or value of
patients to a hospital. The latter type of agreement, however,
could raise an issue under the Anti-Kickback Statute:
A requirement to refer to a specific provider is
different from an agreement not to establish a
competing business. In other words, a covenant
not to compete might prevent a physician from
setting up a private practice or offering services
that compete with the entity that purchased his
or her practice. If an agreement also included the
requirement that the physician refer business to
the purchaser, the agreement would be suspect
under the anti-kickback statute.200
Likewise, a physician’s agreement to refrain from establishing
or owning a competing business in exchange for a hospital
granting him staff privileges should not raise Stark Law issues.
In sum, a hospital’s credentialing policy based on physicians’
economic conflicts of interest would not seem to expose the





hospital to a risk of sanctions under the Stark Law, unless staff
privileges are viewed as creating a financial relationship be-
tween the physician and hospital. A Stark Law violation would
also require a referral of a federal healthcare program patient for
designated health services and the absence of any exception.
3. Public Comments
The American Hospital Association (AHA) recently submitted
comments in response to the OIG’s solicitation on behalf of its
nearly 5,000 member hospitals and other healthcare entities,
opposing the OIG’s suggestion that economic credentialing
might be a form of illegal remuneration or should be regulated
under the Stark Law.201  The AHA urged the OIG not to abandon
its long-held view that staff privileges are not a form of “remu-
neration” because granting privileges does not involve the
transfer of something of value from hospitals to physicians.202
The AHA suggested that effective regulation of staff privileges as
remuneration would require detailed descriptions of the exact
configurations in a particular market, such as number of patients,
number and size of competing hospitals, and role of managed
care networks in the area.203  Such facts would be required to
determine whether granting staff privileges would confer a
monetary benefit on a physician in the specific locale. The AHA
asserted that any less-specific regulations would result in uncer-
tainty and chilling of legitimate credentialing policies.204
The idea of determining whether staff privileges constitute
“remuneration” based on the particular market in which such
privileges are sought was suggested in one of the OIG’s ques-
tions. This idea is problematic for several reasons. First, as noted
in the antitrust discussion, defining and proving these sorts of
market factors can be very challenging. Moreover, the analysis of
market factors and the effect of anticompetitive business prac-
tices falls in the realm of antitrust, rather than anti-kickback,
enforcement. In addition, tying the definition of “remunera-
tion” to market analysis would create considerable uncertainty
regarding a hospital’s ability to adopt not only new conflict of
interest, but also traditional economic credentialing policies.205
Regarding the Stark Law, the AHA also cautioned that if staff
privileges are viewed as remuneration, then any referral of a
federal healthcare program patient to a hospital would be
prohibited.206  Under a broad reading of the Stark Law, the AHA
suggested that the statute prohibits any compensation arrange-
ments between a hospital and a referring physician that involve





any remuneration.207  If staff privileges constitute remuneration,
then a physician’s referral of any federal healthcare program
patient to a hospital at which the physician holds privileges
would violate the Stark Law. Such an interpretation obviously
has dramatic implications for the existing healthcare delivery
system. Finally, the AHA suggested that interjecting the OIG
into the relationship between physicians and hospitals would
impair hospitals’ ability to operate efficiently and provide
quality care.208  These comments, contrasted with the AMA
urging strict government regulation of economic credentialing,
underscore the debate between hospitals and physicians over
this contentious issue. It is far from clear that regulation of
economic credentialing under federal healthcare statutes is
appropriate or will bring any balance to the competing interests
at stake.
B. Covenants Not to Compete
A hospital that is considering adopting an economic
credentialing policy to limit or prohibit competition by medi-
cal staff members should consider not only the potential for
legal liability and damages implicated by such a policy, but also
the possibility that a court will refuse to enforce the policy as a
contractual restraint on trade that violates public policy. As the
Stark Law preamble discussion suggested, an economic
credentialing policy that denies or revokes a physician’s staff
privileges based on investing, owning, or affiliating with a
competing facility is a restraint of trade similar to a covenant
not to compete in a physician employment contract. Accord-
ingly, state law on covenants not to compete may shed light on
the enforceability of a hospital’s economic credentialing policy.
State laws on the enforceability of covenants not to compete
and other restraints on trade vary widely and are based on both
statutory and common law.209  As one example, Texas has
statutorily defined the criteria for enforceability of a covenant
not to compete, which requirements are similar to other states’
laws. First, the agreement must be ancillary to a valid contract,
transaction, or relationship.210  Second, the restriction must
contain reasonable limitations as to time, geographical area,
and scope of activity.211  Finally, these limitations must “not
impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the
goodwill or other business interest” of the party seeking to
impose the restraint.212
If a court analyzed a hospital credentialing policy that prohibits
physicians from owning or investing in competing entities as a





covenant not to compete under the Texas statutory criteria, the
court might conclude that the policy is an unreasonable re-
straint on trade. The credentialing policy would meet the first
criterion because the noncompetition requirement is ancillary
to an otherwise valid medical staff membership or privileges
agreement. A medical staff noncompetition requirement, how-
ever, might not meet the second criterion because it is not
limited in terms of geographical area or scope of activity.
Concerning the third requirement, the policy would probably
be considered reasonable as to time if it applies only during, not
after, termination of the employment, contract, or relation-
ship. In other words, if the duration of a hospital’s economic
conflict-of-interest policy is coterminous with the underlying
agreement or contract for staff privileges or medical staff mem-
bership, then the time restriction could be considered reason-
able. Unless the hospital’s economic conflict of interest policy
was limited in terms of the geographical area and scope of
activity, however, a court might refuse to enforce it.
In addition, the hospital would have to show that there was no
less restrictive way to protect its goodwill or other business
interest than a policy prohibiting physicians from owning or
affiliating with competing businesses. Traditionally, courts
have closely scrutinized covenants not to compete, especially
covenants involving physicians and other professionals, be-
cause they restrict an individual from exercising his chosen
profession. The burdens on the employee or individual, how-
ever, must be balanced against the benefits to the employer or
other entity. A hospital could argue that the restriction on
ownership or investment in competing entities is necessary to
prevent a physician from cherry picking the higher paying,
more profitable cases to the specialty facility in which he has an
interest, while referring the unprofitable or uncompensated
cases to the community hospital, which justification is similar
to the arguments made by the hospitals in Mahan213  and
NYSARC.214  Under Texas law, however, there is no authority
that clearly authorizes a restraint on trade based on this particu-
lar business justification.
The Texas covenant not to compete statute contains special
provisions regarding physicians,215  which require that the cov-
enant not deny the physician access to his patient lists and
medical records.216  These requirements are designed to avoid
interference with the physician-patient relationship and to
ensure that patient care is not compromised.217  The Texas
statutory provisions on physicians contemplate that covenants





not to compete apply for a period of time after the employment or
contract has ended.218  This policy is consistent with the general
purpose of covenants not to compete, which is to prevent an
employee from competing with his former employer after he
leaves such employment. The new economic credentialing poli-
cies generally restrict competition during rather than after termi-
nation of employment. Therefore, this special provision regarding
physicians’ covenants not to compete would not seem to govern
the enforceability of a hospital policy prohibiting physicians
from competing while on the medical staff. The concerns ex-
pressed in this part of the statute regarding interference with the
physician-patient relationships and promotion of quality care,
however, are similarly implicated by a hospital credentialing
policy that limits or restricts medical staff members from affiliat-
ing with competing facilities. A physician or patient might prefer
such specialty facilities because they provide more convenient,
higher quality, or more appropriate care than the general service
hospital. State statutory and common law on covenants not to
compete is not directly applicable to these new economic
credentialing policies, but the general criteria for enforceability
of one type of restraint on trade could inform a court’s decision
whether to enforce a different type of restraint on trade.
C. Section 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status
A nonprofit hospital’s decision to adopt a policy to restrict or
eliminate competition by medical staff members may affect the
hospital’s status as a charitable organization. For an organiza-
tion to be tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Review Code, it must be both organized and operated exclu-
sively for charitable purposes.219  A credentialing policy adopted
expressly to protect a hospital from market competition could
suggest that the hospital is operating for profit-making or other
noncharitable purposes and, thus, could endanger the hospital’s
tax-exempt status.
In Revenue Ruling 69-545, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
identified various factors relevant to whether a nonprofit hos-
pital claiming exemption under Section 501(c)(3) is operated to
serve public, charitable purposes rather than private interests.
The factors include:
• A governing board composed of prominent civic leaders
rather than solely of hospital administrators or physi-
cians;
• A medical staff open to “all qualified physicians” in the
area, consistent with the size and nature of its facilities;





• Operation of a full-time emergency room, open to every-
one, regardless of ability to pay;
• Provision of non-emergency care to everyone in the
community who is able to pay directly or indirectly
through private health insurance, or with the aid of
public programs such as Medicare or Medicaid; and
• Use of net earning to further the charitable purpose and
not to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual.220
Under these factors, adopting a policy that prevents certain
physicians, namely, those with economic conflicts of interest,
from holding staff privileges, could endanger a hospital’s tax-
exempt status. Such a policy appears to violate the criterion that
the medical staff be open to “all qualified physicians in the
area.” Also, an economic conflict-of-interest credentialing policy
has the appearance of placing the financial bottom-line of the
hospital—and, accordingly, the benefit of hospital administra-
tors and shareholders—above charitable purposes. Both of these
factors could cause the IRS to question whether the hospital is
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes.
The Revenue Ruling noted, however, that “[t]he absence of
particular factors set forth above or the presence of other factors
will not necessarily be determinative.”221  Rather, “the [IRS] will
weigh all of the relevant factors and circumstances.”222  An
economic conflict-of-interest credentialing policy, therefore,
may not in and of itself defeat a hospital’s tax-exempt status.
Moreover, as Mahan and other cases suggest, such a policy may be
justified for the very purpose of ensuring that essential medical
services and charity care are available to the community. Never-
theless, if the IRS determines that the underlying purpose of a
hospital’s credentialing policy is not to benefit the community
but rather to benefit private interests, such as the interests of
current medical staff members or hospital owners, the hospital
could lose its tax-exempt status.
D. Public Relations Concerns
As indicated by the AMA’s strong stance against economic
credentialing, the adoption of an economic conflict-of-interest
policy would likely be extremely unpopular with a hospital’s
medical staff. A hospital, therefore, would be required to expend
considerable resources addressing the concerns of a disgruntled,
disruptive medical staff as well as the political and public
relations issues that surely would arise with the announcement





of such a policy. In addition, economic credentialing policies
may invite criticism in the popular media because such policies
could be perceived as placing hospital finances above concern
for quality patient care.
Moreover, even if a physician’s legal challenge to an economic
credentialing policy were unsuccessful, a hospital would still
bear the considerable expense, adverse media exposure, and
distractions of defending a lawsuit. Further, even in the face of weak
challenges, a lawsuit always involves the risk of losing and being
held liable to the excluded physician for considerable damages.
Instead of adopting a policy prohibiting staff physicians from
owning or investing in a competing enterprise, a hospital might
consider a less restrictive policy. For example, a policy that
restricts a medical staff member’s ability to hold certain leader-
ship positions at the hospital, such as a medical director,
medical staff officer, or department head, could accomplish
similar objectives of ensuring loyalty and fiduciary commit-
ment to the hospital’s interests.223  Alternatively, a hospital
might adopt a credentialing policy that requires an applicant
for medical staff privileges merely to provide certain disclosures.
Such disclosures would concern whether the physician has an
investment interest in an entity that would cause the physician’s
interests to be substantially in conflict with the hospital’s or
that would provide a significant economic incentive to refer
patients to other facilities. These less-restrictive alternatives do
not appear to rise to the level of actionable restraints of trade.
Moreover, they might be less likely to raise the ire of the medical
staff and seem justifiable on common business principles.
In addition to potential liability in a lawsuit brought by a
physician who is affected by a hospital’s new economic
credentialing policy, such a policy could expose the hospital to
civil or criminal sanctions under evolving interpretations of
certain federal healthcare statutes. Moreover, a credentialing
policy that protects the hospital from competition by medical
staff members might be unenforceable in a state that prohibits
contractual noncompetition clauses for professionals, such as
physicians. Also, the adoption of such a policy by a nonprofit
hospital could endanger the hospital’s tax-exempt status. Fi-
nally, a hospital considering implementing such a policy should
carefully consider the additional burdens of addressing medical
staff and public relations objections to a policy that appears to
give an unfair and improper competitive edge to the hospital at
the expense of patient care.






The use of economic criteria unrelated to quality of care or
professional competency in determining an individual’s quali-
fications for initial or continuing hospital medical staff mem-
bership or privileges is a recent and controversial idea. Courts
have upheld certain forms of “traditional” economic
credentialing, such as exclusive contract arrangements and
closed staff policies, because they promote efficiency and are
recognized as a reasonable exercise of the board’s authority to
administer the business of the hospital. Policies that exclude
physicians based on ownership or investment in competing
entities, however, are more difficult to justify on the basis of
efficiency or other legitimate business concerns. Moreover, these
new economic credentialing policies inherently restrict competi-
tion and, therefore, may violate antitrust law and policy.
Thus far, only a few courts have considered the enforceability
and liability implications of these new economic credentialing
policies. The courts that have done so were persuaded that such
self-protective policies were necessary to maintain the eco-
nomic viability of the hospital and the availability of essential
community medical services. This justification is questionable
under traditional antitrust policies and reveals a certain dis-
comfort by courts with treating the healthcare marketplace the
same as any other competitive marketplace. This same bias may
influence courts’ decisions regarding the due process implica-
tions of a hospital’s adoption of a policy that has the effect of
depriving a current medical staff member of protected property
interests. Legal challenges to these new policies also call for new
interpretation and application of state laws on contract forma-
tion, breach, and noncompetition clauses.
Such policies also raise new questions under federal statutes
that regulate physicians and other providers participating in
federal healthcare programs, which issues are being fiercely
debated by physician and hospital administration interest
groups on opposing sides. The outcome of this debate over federal
regulatory policy could significantly impact both new and tradi-
tional credentialing policies and other hospital operations. Eco-
nomic credentialing policies based on physician conflicts of
interest also present operational concerns related to hospitals’
tax-exempt status and medical staff and community relations.
In the current healthcare market of declining reimbursement and
rising costs, economic conflict-of-interest policies are likely to





become more commonplace as physicians enter investment and
entrepreneurial activities to supplement their income and hospi-
tals seek novel strategies to protect their revenue streams. As more
hospitals implement self-protective credentialing policies, there
will be more legal challenges by physicians whose staff privileges
are affected, and the case law will continue to clarify the respec-
tive rights and interests of hospital administrators and medical
staff members. In the meantime, a hospital considering whether
to adopt such a policy should carefully consider the risks of
unenforceability, liability, government sanctions, administra-
tive costs, and adverse public relations that would likely arise.
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